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Article
Judicial Vigilantism: Inherent Judicial
Authority to Appoint Contempt

Prosecutors in Young v. United States
ex rel Vuitton Et Fils S.A.
By NEAL DEVINS*
AND STEVEN J

MuLROY**

INTRODUCTION

Inherent executive authority and the separation of powers
have been issues at the forefront of Supreme Court rulings these
past few years.' Flagship cases such as Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha,2 Bowsher v Synar, and Morrison

v Olson4 have ruled on such monumentous issues as the "legislative veto," the delegation of budget-cutting authority to the

Comptroller General, and the appointment of special counsel to
* Assistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A., Georgetown
University, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt Umversity, 1982.
** Law Clerk to Honorable Roger S. Vinson, U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Florida (beginmng summer 1989). B.A., Cornell Umversity, 1986; J.D.
candidate, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. The authors
would like to thank John Garvey for his useful comments and Ashley Kiesel for her
encouragement.
I See generally Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup Or. Rnv 41; Rabkin &
Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: ConstitutionalLimits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the FederalGovernment, 40 STAN. L. Ray 203 (1987); Verkuil,
The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779.
2 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
" 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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investigate and prosecute charges of criminal wrongdoing by
government officials. Among these sequoias of constitutional

law, the Supreme Court quietly resolved a conflict that pitted
executive prosecutorial discretion against the judiciary's inherent
power to vindicate its own authority Arising in a trademark
infringement case, the Court ruled in Young v United States ex

rel Vuitton Et Fils S.A. 5 that federal courts have inherent power
to appoint private counsel to prosecute an alleged contemnor
for violation of a court order 6
Only Justice Scalia took issue with this aspect of the Court's

holding. 7 Characterizing the majority's inherent power argument
as inconsistent with the judiciary's passive role, Justice Scalia
107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987).
Because our concern is this aspect of the Court's ruling, this Article will not
address court authority in "direct" contempt. Direct contempt is distinct from "indirect"
in that the former takes place within the court's presence. See 8 FED. R. Cium. P 42(a);
8B J. MooPE, Mooi.'s FEDERAL PRACTICE 42.02[3] (2d ed. 1987), Direct contempt
generally involves the disruption of courtroom proceedings, yet indirect contempt is the
out-of-court violation of a court order. Because direct contempt proceedings are summary, court appointment of a prosecutor is unnecessary and the judicial appointment
power is not implicated, Summary procedure, however, still gives the judiciary authority
to initiate prosecution.
Separation of powers problems are not raised by "direct" contempt. The immediate
need to quell court disruption justifies the limited ability of the judiciary to "initiate
prosecution" for direct contempt. In fact, Justice Scalia recognized that each branch of
government "must each possess those powers necessary to protect the functioning of its
own processes." Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concurring). Consequently,
Young does not call into question "direct contempt" prosecutions against those who
interfere with the orderly conduct of judicial proceedings.
This Article, moreover, is concerned solely with criminal contempt. Criminal contempt differs from civil contempt both in purpose and execution. Criminal contempt is
punitive in nature. Criminal contempt sentences are for definite penods of time because
the goal is deterrence of future violations. Civil contempt is remedial in nature; sentences
may last only as long as the trial involved but are indeterminate, because the object is
to force the contemnor to comply with a court's order. Once the civil contemnor
complies, the penalty is removed. J. MooRE, supra, at 42.02[2]. Jailing a recalcitrant
witness until he testifies is an example of civil contempt. Imprisoning someone who once
violated an injunction for two years is an example of crimnal contempt.
Justice Scalia agreed with the Young majority that the district court committed
error when it sought to excuse the enforcement of the original order by appointing the
plaintiff's attorney in the underlying trademark suit. This appointment of an interested
party created a conflict of interest undermining the contempt prosecution. See Young,
107 S. Ct. at 2135-38. Justices Powell, O'Connor, White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
however, indicated that the majority erred in assuming that plaintiff's counsel could not
serve as a disinterested prosecutor. Id. at 2147-48 (Powell, Rehnquist, & O'Connor,
J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2148 (White, J., dissenting).
6
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asserted that the enforcement of court orders is a task reserved
to the executive. 8 In our view, Justice Scalia is right. Because of
the traditionally jealous reservation of prosecutorial discretion
to the executive and the similarity between criminal contempts
and regular crimes, the Young majority's "necessity" rationale
does not overnde valid separation of powers concerns.
This Article will be divided into three sections. Section I will
set out the conflict resolved in Young-contrasting the court's
criminal contempt power with traditional prosecutonal discretion. Sections II and III will consider possible justifications for
this divergence. Section II will consider whether contempts are
innately different from crimes in a way that reduces separation
of powers concerns. Section III will address the possibility that
the judicial branch has a umque, inherent, and overriding need
for a power of self-vindication. It is our conclusion that neither
of these rationales support the abandonment of traditional prosecutonal discretion.

I.

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND THE SEPARATION OF

POWERS

The Supreme Court has long held that the judiciary has an
inherent power to pumsh contempts. 9 This power has been construed by lower courts to imply an authority to initiate proceedings, which in turn supports judicial appointment of prosecutors. 0
I An analogous controversy has recently emerged with respect to the civil contempt
power of bankruptcy judges. See Feder & Feder, Judges' Disputed Contempt Power
Supported by High Court Rulings, NAT'L L.J., April 25, 1988, at 26-29.
9 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Michaelson v. United
States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906);
Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1988); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873); Anderson
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
10 See, e.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Conole,
365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967); In re Fletcher, 216 F.2d
915, 917 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 931 (1955); United States ex rel. Brown
v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 734 (1944); Western
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Gotfned, 136 F.2d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1943); O'Malley v. United
States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Pendergast v.
United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943); McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 80 F.2d 211 (2d
Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603 (1936). See generally Recent Developments,
Criminal Contempt: Federal Courts Power to Dismiss Proceeding Before Trial, 66
COLUM. L. Ray 182 (1966).
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While the Supreme Court has recogmzed that Congress may
regulate this power," the Court has never suggested that the
legislature may abrogate it.' 2 Indeed, both the majority and
Justice Scalia agreed in Young v United States ex rel Vuitton
Et Fils S.A.13 that perceived inherent judicial authority underlies
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure's14 assumption that a
judge may appoint private counsel to prosecute an indirect contempt.'- The fact that a United States Attorney had previously
declined to prosecute the alleged contemnor is irrelevant to this
formulation. 16

11

See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 196 n.1 (1968); Michaelson, 266 U.S. at

1

In Michaelson, the Court recognized that Congress could prohibit Court initiated

65-67.
contempt "where the act or thing constituting the contempt is also a cnme in the
ordinary sense." Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66. Michaelson, however, emphasized that tis
legislative restriction in 18 U.S.C. § 401 did not question federal court authority to
punsh a person for disruptive behavior in the courts' presence, for official misbehavior
by a court officer, or for disobedience of a lawful order. In subsequent decisions, the
Supreme Court has likewise held that, despite the courts' inherent power, § 401 imposes
binding limits on court authority. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 203 (§ 401 "narrowly
confined" the contempt authority); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943) (section's prohibition against both fine and imprisonment is binding on all courts); Nye v. United
States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) (courts' inherent contempt power is limited to punishing
conduct proscribed by § 401).
13See 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2130 (1987); id. at 2142 n.10 (Scalia, J., concurnng). A
congressional attempt to authorize this appointment authority would raise issues identical
to the ongoing controversy over federal appointments of independent counsel under the
Ethics in Government Act. In fact, Morrison distinguished Young precisely on these
grounds. See infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
14 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are promulgated
by the Supreme
Court. They become law unless Congress rejects them within 90 days. 18 U.S.C. § 3771
(1982).
1, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 sets out the procedure for prosecution
of a criminal contempt. Section (a) provides for summary disposition of direct contempt,
and Section (b) provides for notice and hearing for indirect contempt. Section (b) requires
notice to take the form of a judge's oral announcement, or, "on application of the
United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose," an
P 42(b) (1982) (emphasis added). See generally
order to show cause. FED. R. CRa.
Note, PrivateProsecutorsin CriminalContempt Actions Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 FoRaHAM L. Rav. 1141 (1986).
,6 In Young, the plaintiff's counsel, at the district court's suggestion, had contacted
the United States Attorney's Office. The Cnrmnal Division Chief, however, expressed
no interest beyond wishing lum luck. Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2129. The Young majority
disapproved of this approach, suggesting that "[judicial] restraint" suggests that a court
"ordinarily" should seek assistance from the "appropriate prosecuting authority." Id.
at 2134. At the same time, Young clearly recognizes that a private prosecutor may be
appointed if that request is denied. Id.
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Judicial criminal contempt power is on the surface at odds
with traditional prosecutorial discretion. The Supreme Court has
continued to emphasize the constitutional grounding of executive
discretion in law enforcement. In United States v Nixon, 17 the
Court insisted that the executive branch retains "absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case,"' 8 citing earlier

decisions tracing prosecutorial discretion to "the constitutional
separation of powers."' 19 Indeed, in the Confiscation Cases, the
Court flatly stated that public prosecutions are "within the
exclusive direction of the district attorney "20 Only evidence of

flagrant bias or discrimination in the pattern of prosecution
2
seems to justify judicial review of decisions not to prosecute. '
Moreover, only those prosecuted or threatened with prosecution

could file such claims because "in American jurisprudence at
least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." 22
Just as private litigants cannot force prosecutions to occur,
lower federal courts have also ruled that Congress has no valid

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
" Id. at 693 (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868)).
19United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub. nom.
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). Thus, "[i]t
follows, as an incident to the
constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free
exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control
over criminal prosecutions." Id. at 171 (emphasis added); see Umted States v. Kilpatrick,
821 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1987) (a judge may not even add by implication an
essential element to an indictment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 699 (1988); Community for
Creative Nonviolence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[tihe power to
decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive's
duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws").
20 Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (emphasis added).
21 In general, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). But
judicial review is available when a litigant shows that a prosecutor has discriminated on
the basis of "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," id., or when a prosecutor
vindictively exercises his discretion for "retaliatory use." Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S.
27, 30 (1984).
Judicial review can also become available when an executive officer refuses to
perform a purely ministenal duty. Kendal v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524 (1838). Ministenal duty is defined as "one in respect to which nothing is left
to discretion." National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 607-08
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 498 (1867)).
1 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see Leeke v. Timmerman,
454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (per cunam), reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1165 (1982).
17
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interest "in having laws executed properly.''23 Unlike private
litigants, Congress can influence enforcement discretion through
the enactment and modification of statutes. Nevertheless, some
room for executive judgment and discretion regarding issues such
as the sufficiency of evidence, the availability of alternative
enforcement mechamsms, and the competing claims of other
cases on enforcement resources will generally remain.
The Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Heckler v. Chaney25
exemplifies these concerns. Concluding that the Food and Drug
Administration presumptively has irreversible discretion to decline to challenge the safety and efficacy of particular drugs, the
Court in Chaney did not hesitate to draw the parallel between
these aspects of admimstrative discretion:
An [adminimstrative or regulatory] agency's refusal to institute
proceedings shares to some extent the charactenstics of the
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indicta decision which has long been regarded as the special province
of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who
is charged by the Constitution "to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.''26

21 American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir.
1982); see Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d
Cir. 1986) (Congress' interest in enforcing a constitutional law is "no more than that of
the average citizen"), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988); Barnes v, Kline, 759 F.2d
21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. granted,sub nom., Burke v. Barnes,
475 U.S. 1044 (1986), judgment vacated, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). The District of Columbia
Circuit, however, has said that Congress has an interest in "the process by which a bill
becomes law" and thus could sue over executive vote "nullification." Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1106 (1985); see Pierce, 697 F.2d at 305. The Third Circuit, however, allows the
House or Senate to intervene in cases where the executive either declines to defend a
statute or declares it unconstitutional. Ameron, Inc., 787 F.2d at 888 n.8. For commentary, see McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. Ray 241
(1981) (arguing for prudential doctrine of equitable discretion); Case Comment, Moore
v. House of Representatives: A Possible Expansion of Congressmen's Standing to Sue,
60 Nomz D.mm L. REv 417 (1985) (arguing for denial of standing on constitutional
grounds).
z One apparent exception is the Ethics in Government Act provisions for the
appointment of special counsel in place of Justice Department officials. See infra notes
143-57 and accompanying text.
25 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
26Id. at 832 (citation omitted). Commentators have debated the ultimate precedential significance of Chaney. Compare Sunstem, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
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The Court further noted that an agency generally is "far better
equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities." 27 Applying this
logic to federal criminal prosecutions, one would imagine that
the Department of Justice is the office in government best
equipped to determine which actions will best further the rule
of law
Recent Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers
also reenforce the propriety of leaving prosecutorial discretion
matters in the executive's hands. The Court has stated that "Etihe
Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial ' 28 and "this system of division and
separation of powers

was deliberately so structured to assure

full, vigorous and open debate on the great issues affecting the
people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on
the exercise of governmental power."21 9 Plainly, both the constitutional emphasis on tripartite division of the federal government
and the delicate balance it creates would be seriously undermined
by arrangements blurring the line between executive and judicial
powers. At the very least, the assumption of executive functions
by the judiciary obscures the parameters of executive discretion
in the implementation of the laws,
Young runs contrary to the growing recognition of the inviolability of executive enforcement discretion. Young demonstrates that the judicial branch has an interest, not only in
general enforcement of court orders, but also in directing prosecution in individual cases. What justifies such an aberration
from traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion? 0 There are

Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653 (1985) (suggesting possible availability of
implied nghts of action and other devices to secure judicial review of agency inaction)
with Rabkm & Devins, supra note 1,at 238-39 (Chaney conforms to agency recognition
of propriety of executive enforcement discretion). Whatever its precedential significance,

Chaney clearly invokes prosecutorial discretion as a shibboleth of inherent executive
prerogatives.
27 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.

u Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3187 (1986).

10Troubled by similar concerns, some circuit court cases have questioned the
authorization of court-appointed private prosecutors under Rule 42(b) prior to the Young
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two possible answers: either contempts are innately different

from crimes in a way that reduces separation of powers concerns,
or the judicial branch has a unique, inherent, and overriding

need for a power of self-vindication. Each of these answers will
be examined in turn.
II.

CONTEMPT AS CRIME

What are the attributes of a crime? Is it the prospect of a
criminal penalty9 Is it the mandate of procedural safeguards to
ensure the protection of constitutional rights? Does it matter
whether the purpose of the proceeding is to vindicate the authority of a branch of government rather than punish conduct
the legislature prescribes as harmful? Is it significant that the
procedures are triggered by noncompliance with a court order
rather than noncompliance with a legislative mandate?
The Supreme Court answered these questions in Young,
either directly or by inference. In the Court's view, prior holdings recognizing "criminal contempt as 'a crime in the ordinary
sense' "I' are inconsequential to the determination of whether
"prosecution of contempt must now be considered an execution

of the crimn al law "32 In other words, crimnal penalties and
concomitant procedural safeguards alone do not make a crime.
Instead, the Young Court emphasized that a criminal contempt
is not "conduct prescribed as harmful by the general criminal
laws." ' 33 It is "conduct that violates specific duties imposed by

decision. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated a contempt conviction
where the prosecutor was the private counsel for opposing party in the underlying action
on the grounds that "the National Sovereign, through its chosen officers, should be in
control of criminal contempt proceedings." Id. at 319. The court remanded with the
instruction that "the District Court, if it determines that the prosecution should go
forward, should designate the United States Attorney and his Assistants." Id. at 320.
The court did not address what would happen if the United States Attorney declined to
prosecute. In a later case, it was argued that the Brotherhood decision demanded that
government attorneys prosecute cnminal contempts. A decision was unnecessary to a
resolution of the case, however, and the court explicitly reserved the issue. United States
v. McKenzie, 735 F.2d 907, 910 n.11 (5th Cir. 1984).
"1 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2133 (1987)
(quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)).
32Id.
33 Id.
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the court itself, arising directly from the parties' participation in
judicial proceedings" and its "fundamental purpose [therefore]

is to preserve respect for the judicial system itself." 3 4 Source,
specificity, and purpose, under this formulation, are critical

components to the determination of what constitutes a crime.
This formulation is unsatisfactory Upon closer examination,
source, specificity, and purpose seem irrelevant to the question
of whether a judicial prosecuting power is somehow mandated
by the separation of powers. In addition, both the history and
modem practice of contempt proceedings make any significant
distinction from criminal proceedings untenable.
A.

History and ContemporaryPractice

Rather than highlighting differences, history and modern
practice generally illustrate the identity between "general crimes"
3
and indirect criminal contempt proceedings. Prior to 1821,'
English common law treated violations of court orders in the
same manner as normal crimes. 36 For example, Sir John Fox's
seminal work on contempt shows no distinction in procedures
37
utilized in contempt and criminal cases from 1253 to 1720.

-1

Id. at 2134.

1, In 1821, Wilmot's opimon became an authoritative part of English law. Rex v.
Clement, 106 Eng. Rep. 918, 923 (1821); see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text;
see also Bloom, 391 U.S. 194, 198 n.2 (1968).
36 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 201-13 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting);
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914) (citing Solly-Flood, 3 Transactions
of the Royal Historical Society, N.S. p. 147 (1885)); Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal
and Civil, 21 HARV L. Rlv. 161, 169-70, 174 (1907-08); Frankfurter & Landis, Power
of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HAvv L. REv. 1010, 1042-52 (1924). See generally
J. Fox, Tn HISTORY OF CONTEPT OF CouRT (1927). While these authorities are
concerned with the summary nature of contempt proceedings, they nonetheless maintain
that contempt proceedings were generally identical to ordinary criminal proceedings
under the early common law.
11 See J. Fox, supra note 36, at Appendix, 227-42; Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 36, at 1042, 1046. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the Supreme Court
simply may have found no basis for summary punishment of out-of-court contempt by
a stranger to the proceedings. Id. at 198 n.2, 200. Although there is language in Fox's
treatise to that effect, the entirety of the work suggests otherwise. For example, on the
same page that he asserts that a contempt by a "stranger out of court was proceeded
against like any other trespass," he also writes that no summary proceeding for "contempts out of court" occurred before the seventeenth century. J. Fox, supra note 36,
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The turning point in the difference in treatment between
crime and contempt came with an erroneous and unreported
King's Bench opinion, The King v Almon, written by Judge
Wilmot in 1765 3s Improperly relying on the "immemorial usage" of the common law, Wilmot-like the Supreme Court in
Young-spoke of the courts' inherent power to use contempt
proceedings as a means to vindicate judicial authority 19 Although the opinion misstated the common law, Blackstone, a
friend of Wilmot's, used the opinion in his Commentaries,"4
where it has "bedevilled the law of contempt both in England

and in this country ever since. "41
American respect for Blackstone's Commentaries "bore this
Almon-phenomenon of England to the United States, where it
was early inculcated as a rule of law "42 By the twentieth century,
"the law of Wilmot had, like fine wine, aged to the point of
unquestioning respect. '43 Early in this century, the Supreme
Court characterized contempts as sui generis, not strictly criminal
in nature. 44

at 4. Furthermore, after summarizing that strangers to the proceedings were punished
"in the ordinary course of law," he notes that "parties to proceedings were governed
by the rules which applied to strangers." Id. at 116. Finally, his Appendix lists cases
where resisters to the King's writ were tried in the ordinary manner. Id. at 227-42.
Frankfurter and Landis, citing Fox but adding their own research, conclude that
up to the "early part of the eighteenth century," contempts committed by persons not
"officially connected with the court" were "dealt with by the ordinary course of law,"
except where the offense occurred in the actual view of the court. Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 36, at 1042. For other works reaching the same conclusion, see also Green,
356 U.S. at 205-07 (Black, J., dissenting); Bloom, 233 U.S. at 610-11 (citing the work
of the British commentator Solly-Flood); Beale, supra note 36, 169-70.
's Because of a procedural error, the proceeding had to be abandoned, and the
court issued no opinion. Wilmot, who had already written his opinion by this point,
included it in his memoirs. J. Fox, supra note 36, at 5-6. Fox criticizes the opinion as
without foundation and contrary to the common law at the time. Id. at 4, 11-15.
9 Id. at 7-8.
40Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 36, at 1047 n.128.
41 Id.
at 1047 Justice Black, in his Green dissent, criticized the case's "baleful
influence on the law of contempt both in this country and in England." Green, 356
U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
42 R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 19 (1963).
43 Id.

- Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326
(1904).
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Remarkably, since the Judiciary Act of 1789 and until the
Young opimon, the Supreme Court and Congress have increas-

ingly returned to the original common law moorings by insisting
that criminal contempt be treated like other crimes.4 1 While the

Court has never ruled that indirect contempt is indistinguishable
from other crimes, this shift in emphasis bespeaks the fundamental identity between contempt and "general crimes."
Numerous Court decisions have equated contempts with gen-

eral crimes." As stated by Justice Holmes:
These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in error
as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that
word has been understood in English speech.4 7

In fact, in Bloom v Illinois, the Court concluded that "the role
of criminal contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws
seem identical-protection of the institutions of our government
and enforcement of their mandates. '

48

Finally, several Supreme

Court rulings recogmze the especially strong need to provide
procedural protections m contempt actions because contempt

4 With respect to Congress, after dissatisfaction with judicial abuse under the
1789 Judiciary Act's unrestricted grant of contempt power, Congress restricted the
contempt powers to "nusbehavior in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to
obstruct justice; misbehavior of court officers in their official transactions; and disobedience of or resistance to the lawful writ, process, order, or decree of the court." Bloom,
391 U.S. at 202-03; see Green, 356 U.S. at 168-72.
See Young, 107 S.Ct. at 2133 (" '[c]rmunal contempt is a crime in the ordinary
sense' ") (quoting Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201); Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42. 66 (1924) ("[tlhe fundamental characteristics of both
[crimes and criminal contempts] are the same"); O'Neal v. United States, 190 U.S. 36,
38 (1903) (an adjudication for contempt is "in effect a judgment in a criminal case");
New Orleans v. The Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 392 (1874) ("[c]ontempt of
court is a specific criminal offense").
41Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610; see also Green, 356 U.S. at 201 (Black, J., dissenting):
As it may now be pumshed criunal contempt is manifestly a crime by
every relevant test of reason or history.
It possesses all the earmarks
commonly attributed to a crime. A mandate of the Government has allegedly been violated for which severe punishment, including long prison
sentences, may be exacted-pumnshment aimed at chastising the violator
for his disobedience.
41 Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201.
46
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"strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's

temperament."

49

Over the course of this century, the Supreme Court has said

that criminal contempt is an "offense" for statute of limitations
purposes 0 and the Constitution's pardon clause; 51 that due process requires a reasonable doubt standard and the self-incrimi-

nation privilege;- 2 that accused contemnors be given prior notice,
a hearing, defense counsel, and the opportunity to present wit54
nesses;53 that courts adhere to the normal rules of evidence;
that the accused contemnor has a right to a public trial before

an impartial judge-5 and to confront and cross-examine witnesses; 56 and that the accused contemnor has a right to a jury
trial.5 7 Today, aside from the appointments power recognized in

Young, criminal proceedings differ from indirect criminal contempt only in the need for grand jury indictments.58 Indeed, the

41 Id. at 202; see Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952) (contempt is an
offense against a judge's "dignity and authority"), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 931 (1952);
Locke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (contempt may involve personal attack
on judge); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888) (a contemnor insults a court's
"dignity").

10Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610-13.
11Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 89 (1925).
52 Gompers, 221 U.S. at 418.
1 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
-1 See generally Nilva v. United States,
352 U.S. 385 (1957), reh'g denied, 353
U.S. 931 (1957).
1 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
56 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
57 Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202.
11 United States v. Nunn, 622 F.2d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1099-1102 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
See Kuhns, Limiting the Crimmal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Prosecutor and
the GrandJury, 73 MICH. L. REv 483, 492-93 (1974-75) (advocating that contempts be
treated like crimes in all respects). Because federal grand juries are technically a part of
the executive branch, the failure to convene a grand jury is consistent with court-initiated
contempt proceedings. For a recent discussion of federal grand juries, see Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in CongressionalInvestigations, 88 CoLTrM. L. REv. 145 (1988).
Two other minor differences arise between crimes and contempts. First, while
violation of an invalid statute is not punishable under criminal law, violation of a court
order is crimnal contempt regardless of the order's -validity. Maness v. Meyers, 419
U.S. 449, 458-59 (1975). This procedural difference, however, hardly justifies a judicial
contempt appointment power. Because it affords court orders even more respect and
efficacy under the law than the status that statutes enjoy, it actually reduces the need
for judicial self-enforcement. It thus makes a contempt appointment power even less
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Court in Young construed the contemporary practice to be to
treat criminal contempt like other crimes. 59 Young, however,
finds support for the judicial appointments power. It points to
the umque source, specificity, and purpose of indirect contempt,
which distinguish contempt from "general crimes." 6° Young also
speaks of the essentially passive nature of judicial proceedings,
which makes the contempt power "necessary" to the judiciary's
ability to function as a coequal branch.61 We shall first consider
source, specificity, and purpose.
B.

Source, Specificity, and Purpose

SOURCE: It is hard to fathom why the Young Court finds
significant the fact that indirect criminal contempt is triggered
by refusal to comply with a court order, rather than by legislatively enacted criminal law 62 Because both types of malfeasance
are subject to criminal penalty, no intuitive reason exists to claim
that a violation of the criminal law is a crime whereas nonacquiesence to a valid court order is a noncrime subject to criminal
penalty In both cases, the court is pumshing criminally a breach
of socially acceptable conduct. Common sense suggests that the
punishability of the breach defines the crime, not the source of
the norm that is subject to punishment upon violation. Undoubtedly, one would be hard pressed to explain to the criminal
contemnor awaiting sentencing that his conduct was noncriminal. 63

compelling.
Second, judges have plenary discretion regarding dismissal of contempt prosecutions: a federal judge may dismiss an otherwise valid contempt prosecution if she finds
in her discretion that no public interest would be served by continuation of the proceeding. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965). This power, of course, is
merely the other side of the Young power to initiate indirect contempt prosecutions.
Our critique of Young is therefore applicable to this practice.
S9 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 ("Our insistence on the cnminal character of contempt
prosecutions has been intended to rebut early characterizations of such actions as
undeserving of the protections normally provided in criminal proceedings.").
60 Id. at 2133-34; see infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
61 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2131-34; see infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
62 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (distinguishing contempt from "conduct proscribed
as harmful by the general crumnal laws").
63 This is especially true in Young, where one of the contemnors received a five
year "nonsentence." Id. at 2128 n.l.
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The source argument also falters because contempts are violations of the general criminal law. 18 U.S.C. section 401 makes
"[d]isobedience or resistance to . . [a court's] lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command" punishable by fine
or imprisonment. 64 Although section 401 can be characterized as
merely codification of an inherent judicial power, 65 it is nonetheless a congressional statute applicable to all individuals within
the jurisdiction of the United States. Indeed, in Bloom v Illinois, 66 the Supreme Court characterized this provision as "the
67
basis for the general power to punish criminal contempt.
SPECIFICITY The Young Court's emphasis on the fact
that-unlike other criminals-the criminal contemnor "violates
specific duties imposed by the court itself ' 68 can mean one of
two things, neither of which justifies the conclusion that cnminal
contempt is not a crime. First, the Court might view a court
order as distinct from a law of general applicability because it
only binds the participants in a judicial proceeding. With respect
to those participants, however, the court order is as much a
legal mandate as any legislative provision. Furthermore, legislative enactments do not truly apply to all; anti-pollution measures
only affect those who mght pollute, and the restraint of trade
prohibition only affects those who might restrain trade. Contempt as a consequence of noncompliance with a court order
therefore seems as much a rule of general applicability as the
penalties associated with violations of environmental or antitrust
laws.
Second, the Court might consider criminal contempt as an
internal bookkeeping measure thereby not implicating the broader
concerns of legislatively enacted criminal law In fact, Young
places significant weight on the fact that a "parties' participation
in judicial proceedings" is a prerequisite to an indirect contempt
prosecution. 69 This distinction is unsatisfactory It restates the
"source" argument, i.e., criminal contempt is not a crime be-

18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
6,See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

391 U.S. 194 (1968).
67 Id. at 203-04.

Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2134,
69

Id.

1987-88]

CONTEMPT PROSECUTORS

cause crimes are a legislative statement of social mores. In other
words, even if one views indirect contempt as essentially an
internal matter, the availability of a criminal penalty necessarily
means that contempt-like other crimes-is a breach of socially
acceptable conduct.
Specificity concerns, moreover, extend beyond judicial action. For example, administrative agencies make determinations
just as specific as court orders, binding on specific parties, and
yet the agencies have no power to institute criminal prosecutions
for violations of their rulings. Young surely does not intimate
that they should be able to do so,70 rather than refer such
violations to the United States Attorney as they now do9
PURPOSE: Young also distinguishes indirect contempt from
"the general cnrminal laws" because contempt prosecutions "serve
71
the limited purpose of vindicating the authonty of the court.
Yet, do not violations of "general" laws challenge the authority
of the legislature? How then can one distinguish between general
law prosecutions from limited contempt prosecutions? It seems
far-fetched to argue that the object of the contemnor's offense
is court authority (rather than the court order she seeks to evade)
whereas the object of the "general" law violator is the substantive law (rather than the legislative body which enacts it).72
Considering the implausibility of this argument, this rationale
seems little more than a naked statement that the judiciary is
institutionally less able to withstand noncompliance than the
other branches of government. Even if this necessity argument
is true, however, it speaks only to judicial authority in contempt
actions. It does not suggest that indirect contempt is not a crime.
The notion that, in light of this purpose, contempt is inherently different from other crimes is troubling on another count.
Under this formulation, all laws seem fundamentally different
from each other for they all concern different areas and serve
different purposes. Contempt concerns judicial authority just as

the Ethics in Government Act concerns executive branch corrup70 See

R. GOLDFARa, supra note 42 at 128-61 (arguing that such a power should

exist).
7, Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2133 (emphasis added).

7 The Bloom Court makes precisely this point. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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tion. Yet Young certainly does not counsel that the executive's
special interest in internal corruption justifies plenary executive
control of Ethics in Government Act enforcement. It therefore
seems incomprehensible that a law's purpose should serve as the
initial reference point for gauging the applicability of traditional
criminal enforcement.
The failure of source, specificity, and purpose to justify
distinct treatment for contempt leaves only the "necessity" rationale. We shall now turn our attention to this justification.
III.

THE NECESSITY RATIONALE

The Young Court also grounded its opimon in necessity The
Court warns that, without the contempt appointment power, the
judiciary would be dependent on the executive to vindicate its
authority, thereby rendering the courts "mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory ",73
Young further supports this assumption of "quasi-executive"
power by highlighting the passivity of the judicial function.
Unlike the other -branches of government whose jurisdiction
"would include the entire population,

' 74

a judicial contempt

authority extends "only" over those whose obligations spring
from an earlier court proceeding. 75 Consequently, rather than
extending the judiciary into the executive sphere, the contempt
power merely prevents the transformation of the judicial power
into a "mere mockery "176
Justice Scalia took issue with this reasomng, arguing that
the judicial power is limited to "the power to decide, in accordance with law, who should prevail in a case or controversy ,,77
Furthermore, claiming that the separation of powers presupposes
that each branch is somewhat dependent on other branches to
put into effect their judgments, 78 Justice Scalia accuses the ma-

Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2132
(1987) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911)).
14 Id. at 2134 n.10.
7

75

Id.

Id. at 2131 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450).
Id. at 2142 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 2143.
76
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jority of validating a tyrannical regime in which judges make
the laws, prosecute their violation, and sit in judgment of their
prosecution [Sic] .79
In our view, Justice Scalia makes the better argument. Our
system of checks and balances presupposes interdependence. This
seems especially true in the case of the judiciary, "the least
dangerous branch." Consequently, unless institutional necessity
mandates some deviation from executive prosecutonal discretion,
the executive should bring forward cnminal contempt cases. A
review of the law of congressional contempt and an assessment
of indirect criminal contempt's impact on core judicial functions
convinces us that Young's "necessity" rationale is without merit.
This section shall detail our reasoning on this matter.
A.

JudicialIndependence and the Separation of Powers

The dependence on one branch to carry out the will of
another is fundamental to the separation of powers. From President Jackson's infamous response to McCulloch v Maryland
("John Marshall has made his decision, let him enforce it")8l to
Justice Jackson's astute recognition in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v Sawyer that "[w]hile Congress cannot deprive the
President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress
can provide him an army or navy to command" 2 to the current
controversy over the independent counsel, 3 it is axiomatic that
each branch plays a critical role in the other branches' effectiveness. Congress depends on the executive to enforce the laws,
and the judiciary and the executive both depend on Congress to
support their operations. The judiciary also depends on Congress
and the executive to pass legislation and undertake enforcement
mechanisms that will make its decisions meaningful. 84 Even within

I at 2145.
Id.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
" The phrase is reputed. See J. AGREsTo, Tr

SUREmME COURT AND CONSTTU-

TioNAL DEMOCRACY 90 (1984).

f' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson,

J., concurring).
Mornson v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
' School desegregation is a prime example. The Supreme Court's mandate in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was little more than a false promise
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the area of contempt, judges depend on executive officials to
arrest and jail convicted contenmors. No principle of necessity
gives Congress the power to prosecute and jail law violators if
the executive fails to do so or gives the executive the authority

to support itself when Congress fails to appropriate funds.
Recogmzing the sanctity of separation of powers, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that no branch may exercise

a function reserved to a coordinate branch. Executive efforts to
exercise lawmaking functions were declared invalid in
Youngstown85 as were executive efforts to control the judiciary's
adjudicatory power in United States v Nixon8 6 and Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.87 Congressional efforts
to exercise executive/administrative functions have been rejected
in Buckley v Valeo, 8s Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha,8 9 and Bowsher v Synar 90 Finally, in United States
v Brown, 91 the Court ruled that the Bill of Attainder Clause
was intended as a "safeguard against legislative exercise of the
judicial function.''92 All of these cases speak to the same prop-

osition, namely, "that individual freedoms will best be preserved

until Congress and the executive took steps to desegregate public schools. In fact, with
the advent of executive and legislative programs, more actual desegregation of southern
schools occurred in 1965 than in the decade following Brown. See Devins & Stedman,
New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School DesegregationCases,
59 NomRE DAm8 L. REv 1243, 1246-51 (1984); Kirp, School Desegregation and the
Limits of Legalism, 47 PuB. INTEREsT 101 (Spring 1977); see also T. BECKER & M.
FEELY, Tan IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONs 69-76 (1973) (discussing delays in the
enforcement of school desegregation decisions).
" Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579 (executive may not exercise article I lawmaking
powers granted to Congress).
86 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive may not exercise article III adjudicatory power
granted to judiciary).
87 Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (executive
appointment of bankruptcy judges violates article III adjudicatory power).
8s 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per cunam) (Congress may not retain power to remove
officials exercising executive authority).
"' 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Congress may not utilize single-house veto to control
administrative agencies).
-o106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (executive powers cannot be entrusted to officials who
can be removed by Congress).
9-381 U.S. 437 (1965).
92 Id. at 442; see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (Congress
improperly exercises executive authority when it interferes with agency rulemaking).
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through a separation of powers and division of functions among
' 93
the different branches and levels of government.
In the case of the judiciary, the necessity of prohibiting
courts from assuming the responsibilities of the other branches
becomes especially clear. In The Federalist,Alexander Hamilton
has set forth the classic statement on the limits of judicial powerThe judiciary
has no influence over either the sword or
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth
of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of
94
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
Ascribing to this view of the judiciary as "the weakest of the
three departments of power"9 " makes life tenure for judges
acceptable. The courts are given the power of judicial review
completely insulated from outside influence precisely because
their opimons are only as valid as they are persuasive. Indeed,
for Hamilton, "there is no liberty if the power of judging be
not separated from the legislative and executive powers. "96
All of this is not to say that the judiciary is absolutely
forbidden from performng nonjudicial acts. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the separation of powers does not require
"a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government
from one another, ' 9 7 but judicial encroachment into the executive sphere must be justified by true "necessity " In other words,
the rhetoric of Young-that without the power to initiate indirect
criminal contempt, the judiciary will be a "mere mockery"must be close to correct. We shall now explore the veracity of
the Young argument.
B. Direct Versus Indirect Contempt: Towards an Understanding
of Essential JudicialFunctions
The Young Court, pointing to a long line of precedents, held
that the contempt power speaks both to the disruption of court
9,United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
9 TiE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
9 Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
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proceedings and the enforcement of court orders. 98 Consequently, Young views the distinction between in-court and outof-court contempts as pertinent only to procedural matters, rather
than inherent judicial authority 99 Justice Scalia takes issue with

this depiction of prior Court decisions. In his view, the most
recent of these prior precedents-Bloom v Illinots100-"specifically rejected [earlier decisions'] rationale that courts must have

self-contained power to punish disobedience of their judgments." 10 1
We need not resolve whether Justice Scalia or the Young

majority is the better reader of precedent. In our view, indirect
criminal contempts cannot be supported by a "necessity"

ra-

tionale and therefore are violative of the separation of powers
scheme. 0 2
Young's necessity argument is of two parts, namely- (1)
without indirect criminal contempt, " 'a party can make himself

a judge of the validity of orders which have been issued'

"103

and (2) intrusion into the other branches spheres of authority is

de minimis because the criminal contempt power is limited to
those whose legal obligations result from prior court proceedings. 10 4 Neither of these arguments adequately supports indirect

criminal contempt.
The first argument, necessity, appears incorrect on at least

two counts. The use of criminal sanctions to deter future viol" Young, 107 S.Ct. at 2132 (citing Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324,
333 (1904); Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)).
" Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2132-33.
10oBloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
1o Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101See also Cohen, Self-love and the Judicial Power to Appoint a Special Prosecutor, 16 HoFsmA L. REv 23 (1987) (criticizing necessity rationale in Young).
103Young, 107 S.Ct. at 2132 n.8 (citing Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450). In a May
1988 decision, the Supreme Court clarified this necessity holding. United States v.
Providence Journal Co., 108 S.Ct. 1502 (1988). Upholding the Solicitor General's power
to authorize all certiorari filings by the United States, the Providence Journal Court
dismissed a writ of certiorari filed by a court-appointed prosecutor. In distinguishing
Young, the Court claimed that the executive's plenary authority in tlus area does not
implicate necessity concerns. Id. at 1507-10. Since a court-appointed prosecutor can only
seek certiorari if her contempt prosecution has already failed, the Court reasoned that
"the necessity that required the appointment of an independent prosecutor has faded
and, indeed, is no longer present." Id. at 1508.

1o4
Id. at 2134 n.10.
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ations of court orders seems an executive function. The judicial
role is the resolution of cases or controversies. Consequently, it

appears that the judiciary need only the authority to punish
direct contempts or at most an additional coercive civil contempt
power for out-of-court obstructions of judicial proceedings. The
logic underlying the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity for
the violation of constitutional rights supports this reasoning. 105

Judicial immunity springs from the notion that principled and
fearless decisionmaking is a prerequisite to the effective exercise

of the judicial function. This concern of the judicial function,
however, is with the right to decide a case, not with the rightness
or wrongness of the decision. Concern over compliance with a
court order, in our view, speaks more to the correctness of a
decision than to the decisionmakng process and is therefore not

an integral element of the judicial function.
The "necessity"

argument has another fault. Necessity pre-

supposes that criminal contempt is the only mechanism that will
instill needed respect in the judiciary. Civil contempt, however,
can be quite effective. 1°6 For example, the United States Catholic
Conference was recently subject to a civil contempt penalty of
over $100,000 per day for its failure to comply with a discovery
order. 0 7 Young neither can nor does address this issue.
Young's second argument, scope, is also unsupportable. The
contempt power is not always limited to the parties before the
court. 0 8 Moreover, parties do not necessarily "assume the risk"
1OSee generally Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), reh'g denied, 436 U.S.

951 (1978); Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980
DUKE L.J. 879; Note, Liability of Judicial Offices Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322 (1969).
,01 While it is of course true that the executive enforces civil as well as criminal
law, separation of powers concerns are less acute here. Civil contempt proceedings are
considered a part of the original cause of action whereas cnminal contempt is a collateral
proceeding "between the public and the defendant." Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445 (1911).
'°7 See Brief for Petitioners, United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., at 8 (arguing, in part, that a court without article III power cannot
issue a subpoena or coerce compliance through civil contempt). The Supreme Courtaccepting the petitioners' argument-recently overturned this award. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988).
" See, e.g., Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967) (affirming the
contempt conviction of a television news photographer who took photographs in the
hallway outside a courtroom in violation of a standing order). Admittedly, the objection
here is more analytical than practical because cases of this type are not very common.
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by coming before the court voluntarily. Because anyone can be
sued, the "parties potentially subject to" 19 the court's contempt

authority do, in fact, "include the entire population. '"" 0 For
this very reason, Young's attempt to distinguish a judicial con-

tempt power from a congressional enforcement power is
strained."'
A host of pragmatic reasons also supports rejection of
Young's "necessity" "nonintrusiveness" rationale. The indirect
criminal contempt power that Young gives the judiciary is far

from harmless. From a functional perspective, the criminal con2
tempt power presents a very real problem of institutional bias."1
Judges are more likely to perceive insults to their authority than

are Umted States Attorneys, and therefore are more likely to
initiate proceedings in borderline cases. Indeed, the anticipated
standards for prosecution must be lower for a judge than for a
prosecutor because Young envisions cases where a judge will go

forward after a prosecutor has declined."' Thus, an unintended
consequence of Young may be the establishment of a dual criminal justice system-one for violators of the "general" law enforced by the United States Attorney, the other-possibly utilizing

a lower threshold for actionable wrongdoing-for violators of
court orders enforced by the judiciary
109Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2134 n.10.
1,0Id.
"I See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
"2 See generally Komesar, Back to the Future-An Institutional View of Making
andInterpreting Constitutions,81 Nw U.L. REv 191 (1987) (advocating a "comparative
institutional" approach to separation of powers, wherein the resources, abilities, and
biases of each branch are considered when assigning powers and functions among the
branches).
"I The D.C. Circuit raised such fundamental concerns in In re Sealed Case, 838
F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
In invalidating the special counsel law, the court suggested that a lower standard for
prosecution existed for subjects of an independent counsel investigation, and thus "fundamental fairness" problems might arise. Id. at 510. In reversing this decision, the
Supreme Court did not comment on this concern.
Functional concerns did play a part in Morrison, however. In defense of the special
counsel provision, the Court argued that judges are "especially well qualified" to appoint
prosecutors. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611 n.13 (1988). This proposition is troublesome.
Although the Court was merely contrasting the judiciary's qualifications in appointing
legal counsel with the qualifications of non-legal officials, the Court was more accurate
in its 1985 recognition that enforcement decisions are "peculiarly within [the] expertise"
of the executive. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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As the "injured party," moreover, a judge is precisely the
worst person to make the decision to prosecute, because she is
an interested participant. Indeed, in Bloom v, Illinois, the Court
recognized the "potential for abuse' 1 4 in summary contempt
because "[m]en who make their way to the bench sometimes
exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other
weaknesses to which human flesh is heir." 11 5
These dangers are heightened under the existing federal rules,
because in criminal contempt cases not involving "disrespect to
or criticism of a judge," the presiding judge makes the complaint, decides whether to prosecute, appoints the prosecutor,
presides over the trial, and, upon conviction, sentences the defendant.116 Justice Scalia therefore raised no idle concern when
he complained in Young of "judges' [sic] m effect making the
laws, prosecuting their violation, and sitting in judgment of those
1 17
prosecutions."
Aside from the inherent bias of the courts, executive officials' innate experience with prosecutorial discretion makes assignment of this duty to article II officials desirable from a
functional perspective. Enforcement decisions require the weighing of a large number of factors, including the sufficiency of
evidence, the availability of alternatives, the allocation of scarce
resources, and others. The consideration of these factors by the
executive is "peculiarly within its expertise," and thus the executive "is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the
many variables involved." 118
On the most practical level, the appointment power is simply
not necessary to protect the judiciary from impotence. Courts
in civil law countries do not enjoy such a power, but they
nonetheless maintain their efficacy 119 The Supreme Court has
11

'

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).

Id. at 202, n.4 (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952)).

M,6
Rule 42(b) provides for disqualification of the "injured" judge from presiding

at the contempt trial only when the "contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism
of a judge.
" Federal courts have held that the same judge whose order was disobeyed
can sentence the contemnor. United States v. Prugh, 479 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967).

But see United States v. Combs, 390 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1968).
7 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2145 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'" Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
i R. GOLDFARs, supra note 42, at 22.
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used its contempt power only once, 120 and yet it is by no means
1 21
a "mere board of arbitration.
Courts can depend on the executive to enforce contempt
judgments, just as they already depend on the executive to
enforce liens and imprison individuals whom the courts adjudicated as criminals. As noted earlier, even in the contempt context, courts trust the executive to arrest and punish those judged
to be in contempt.'2
Prosecutors simply will not refuse judges' requests to prosecute contemnors. A study of federal prosecutors on this subject
showed that they uniformly initiate proceedings against recalcitrant witnesses. 23 One federal district has adopted a policy of
initiating criminal contempts by indictment. Prosecutors there
have not refused judges' requests to seek contempt indictments.
The Chief Judge considered such a refusal unlikely in light of
the close working relationship between the court and the prosecutors.' 24 Indeed, given attorneys' natural eagerness to keep
themselves in the judge's good graces, any refusal of a valid
request seems unlikely, and refusals on a level sufficient to
undermine respect for the judiciary seem wildly improbable.
The majority in Young acknowledged this:
In practice, courts can reasonably expect that the public prosecutor will accept the responsibility for prosecution. Indeed,
the Umted States Attorney's Manual § 9-39 -318 (1984) expressly provides: "In the great majority of cases the dedication
of the executive branch to the preservation of respect for
judicial authority makes the acceptance by the U.S. Attorney
,,125
of the court's request to prosecute a mere formality
The majority used the likelihood of executive compliance to
minimize the effect of its decision. Analytically, that likelihood
undercuts the rationale for the decision. There is simply no
reason to disrupt the separation of powers when the executive is
likely to pursue indirect contempt violations.
11 United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
121 Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450).
2Id.
at 2143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"2 Kuhns, supra note 58, at 512-13 & n.134.
"I Id. at 503 n.98.
2
Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2134.
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These pragmatic concerns, combined with the unpersuasiveness of Young's "necessity" and "scope" rationales, convince
us that indirect criminal contempt is not essential to the integrity
of the judicial system. Consequently, this deviation from separation of powers is unsupportable.
C. Lessons from Other Places
1. Contempt of Congress
Contempt of Congress' actions' 26 buttress our conclusion that
indirect contempt prosecutions are not an essential judicial attribute. In fact, while "necessity" does not justify inherent
congressional power to punish criminal contempt, the "necessity" argument here is much stronger than the necessity argument accepted by Young for indirect criminal contempt.
Congress has no inherent power to punish for criminal contempt. 27 In contrast to Britain, where legislative contempt is
immune from judicial review,'2 Congress has inherent power
only to "coerce" by civil contempt. This power is inherent
because without it Congress could not effectively undertake its
legislative mission but instead would be left "exposed to every
indignity and interruption, that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may mediate against it.''129 Dissatisfied with the narrow
scope of its inherent power, Congress enacted legislation in 1857
providing for criminal contempt. 130 In In re Chapman,'3 , the
Court validated this provision as "an act necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the powers vested in Congress and

'11 See generally United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNFLicTs BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THM PRESIDENT 184-220 (1985); Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private
Persons, 40 S. CAL. L. REV 189 (1967).
I" The Constitution does explicitly vest Congress with a number of judicial powers,
including the power to pumsh members. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190
(1880).
2 L. FISHER, supra note 126, at 187.
' Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 228.
Act of January 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1982)).
"' 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
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in each House thereof."'' 2 Critical to this holding was the Court's
recognition that the object of contempt prosecutions was the
"disclosure of evidence" essential to Congress' legislative function. 33 Congress' contempt power thus aids its investigative function, which is central to its constitutional role.
Criminal contempt of Congress is different from indirect
criminal contempt in two critical respects. First, congressional
contempt is undertaken pursuant to a "general" law because
the legislature's inherent contempt power extends only to coercion, not punishment. Unlike indirect criminal contempt, contempt of Congress reenforces the maxim that the legislature
specifies that which is criminal. Second, congressional contempt
speaks only to conduct that directly impedes the legislative function. Unlike indirect criminal contempt, this requirement ensures
that the contempt mechanism is narrowly tailored to essential
legislative functions.
Procedures governing the filing of a congressional contempt
action are also instructive. Under 2 U.S.C. section 194, the
House Speaker or Senate President shall certify facts constituting
a contempt of Congress "to the appropriate U.S. attorney,
whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury
for its action."' 13 4 Because "shall" does not necessarily mean
"must,''135 it is possible that the statute preserves prosecutorial
discretion.3 6 In fact, the Reagan adrmnistration adopted this
view in its handling of contempt of Congress charges against
37
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch.'
Even if section 194 mandates executive action, 38 the intrusion
on executive prerogatives may be minimal in practice. The prosId. at 671.
Id. (quoting Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, 130-31 (D.C. Cir.

1895)).
-- 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1982) (emphasis added).
W"See generally Sutton, Use of "Shall" in Statutes, 4 JoHN MARSMHALL L.Q. 204

(1938).
116

But cf. Exparte Frankfeld, 32 F Supp. 915, 916 (D.D.C. 1940) (U.S. Attorney

has no discretion with contempts of Congress but must submit the facts to the grand
jury).
"I See 129 Cong. Rec. H6441-47 (1983); L. FiSHER, supra note 126, at 211-12.

131In our view, because the executive retains complete discretion over the manner in which it should bring a contempt of Congress case, any obligation to present the case
before the grand jury is no more than a "ministerial" task.
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ecutor would still retain discretion to handle the case in a manner
she deemed appropriate. 139 This "safety valve" is unavailable in
Young, where executive prosecutorial discretion may be turned
over to a judicial appointee. 4° Moreover, legislative initiation
may well be consistent with the separation of powers. Because
the criminal contempt power appears a necessary corollary to
the investigative function 141 and because the executive retains
discretion in handling the case, neither of the two principal
infirmities of Young prosecutions are present. In addition, the
failure of the executive to initiate contempt proceedings is a
more realistic concern with congressional contempt than with
the violation of court orders because resistance to congressional
142
subpoenas may come from administration officials.
The analogy between congressional contempt and directed
criminal contempt cuts against the Young decision. Congressional contempt may well preserve prosecuforial discretion. Congressional contempt, moreover, is a narrowly tailored means of
protecting Congress' investigative function.
2.

Independent Counsel

Another, more obvious analogy is the Ethics in Government
Act provisions allowing for the court appointment of independent counsels by "Special Division" panels.143 While serious sep-

"I R. GOLDFARB, supra note 42, at 42.
''
In fact, court control over both the appointment of the prosecutor and the
sentencing of the contemnor make it likely that the court-appointed prosecutor will do
little else than help put into effect the appointing court's preference.
'" This, of course, is the critical question. On the one hand, criminal contempt of
Congress enhances legislative investigations by deterring noncompliance. On the other
hand, as with judicial contempt, a long line of decisions recogizes its equivalence to
ordinary crime for procedural purposes. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755
(1962); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); Flaxer v. United States, 358
U.S. 147, 151 (1958); Sacher, 356 U.S. at 577; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,
208 (1957); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-92 (1929). Consequently, except
for in-the-chambers disruption of proceedings, congressional contempt is analytically
and functionally indistinguishable from ordinary crime; as a result, any reservation of
prosecutorial discretion by Congress is an impermissible intrusion into executive prerogatives and an unwarranted arrogation of power, plagued by the same potential for
institutional bias as the judiciary's discretion to prosecute insults to its own authority.
"' See, e.g., United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F Supp. 150 (D.D.C.
1983); L. iSHR, supra note 126, at 211-13.
14 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 49, 591 et seq. (Supp. 1988).
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aration of powers concerns are raised by this practice, 144 problems
presented by court-appointed special prosecutors are simply not
of the same magnitude as Young-approved indirect criminal
contempt.
Ethics Act procedures are less intrusive on prosecutorial
discretion than the judicial appointment power approved in
Young. The Act gives the Attorney General a role in the decision
whether to prosecute. He decides initially whether to conduct a
preliminary investigation. 45 After any such investigation, he decides whether an independent counsel is needed at all. 146 Neither
of these decisions is judicially reviewable. 147 Thus, if the executive feels that prosecution is unwarranted or detrimental, it can
block prosecution-a prerogative unavailable to the executive in
Young. Further, the appointments have express statutory au148
thorization, something not enjoyed by contempt appointments.
The Attorney General also defines the scope of the investigation. As the Court construed the Act in Morrison, the Special
Division may not expand this scope. 49 Any post-appointment
'
duties it possesses, held the Court, are merely "ministerial." "IS
The Attorney General, finally, is empowered to remove the
special counsel. Although removal must be for "good cause"' 5'
'" See Rabkin and Devins, supra note 1 at 223-24. This essay will not assess the
correctness of Morrison. In our view, whether or not Morrison was rightly decided,
indirect criminal contempt is both an improper self-aggrandizement of judicial power
and an unjustifiable limit on executive prosecutorial discretion.
"4 The Attorney General is not compelled to act unless he determines that the
information presented to him is "sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate." 28
U.S.C.A. at § 591(a) (Supp. 1988).
"'
Id. at § 592(b)(1).
"'
See Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nathan v. Smith, 737
F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Accord Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 (1988)
("the Special Division has no power to appoint an independent counsel sua sponte; it
may only do so upon the specific request of the Attorney General, and the courts are
specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's decision not to seek appointment).
,", Morrison emphasized this statutory attribute. Noting that the appointments
clause authorizes Congress to vest appointment of "inferior officers" "in the Courts of
Law," the Court effectively concluded that appointments clause concerns were satisfied.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-11.
,' Id. at 2613 nn. 17 & 18.
110Id. at 2613-14. Although the Special Division is authorized to terminate the
special counsel's office when her investigation is clearly over, the Court found this
authority insignificant. Id.
"1 28 U.S.C.A. at § 596(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). The special counsel can also be removed
for any "condition that substantially impairs the performance of [her] duties." Id.
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(thereby ensuring that the special counsel possesses "a degree of
independent discretion ''152 to exercise her powers), this removal
power guards against court-sponsored prosecutions based either

in malice or vindictiveness.
The necessity rationale that supports the Ethics Act, moreover, is much weightier than that advanced in Young. The
Watergate experience is only the most dramatic example of
possible abuse when executive officers are charged with policing

themselves.15 1 In contrast, conflict-of-interest considerations work
for the opposite result in Young. A judge who feels slighted

may first select a champion to vindicate his authority and then
sit in judgment over the person who offered the slight. Meritless
prosecutions, overzealous execution, and disproportionate sentences are a likely consequence of such a scheme.
Most significant, judicial aggrandizement concerns which
plague indirect criminal contempt are less significant here. 154 The
Ethics Act places severe limits on the Special Division. The
Attorney General first determines the need for an independent
counsel and then defines the scope of her investigation. 55 Whether
and how the independent counsel brings forward her case are

also nonreviewable decisions. 156 Finally, Division members are

108 S. Ct. at 2608.
An identical argument can be made with respect to contempt orders directed
against the executive. If Justice Department officials have sole authority over the prosecution of such digressions, real conflict-of-interest problems are present. Consequently,
the necessity justification for indirect criminal contempt is much stronger in such cases.
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit argued that there is a significant institutional
an office dedicated
bias within the independent counsel's office: "The need to justify
solely to one goal," and "the success of the office itself, in the public's eyes," are
"unique incentives" to go forward and seek indictments where they may not otherwise
be appropriate. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 509-10 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub
nom., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Morrison, however, found that Ethics
Act procedures are designed to avoid a conflict of interests. The Court concluded that,
since the Special Division has no power to review actions taken by either the Attorney
General or independent counsel, its actions will not be biased. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at
2615. The Court also found significant the Act's prohibition against Division member
participation in independent counsel prosecutions. Id.
"14 Act procedures do allow for the stripping of power from the executive, however.
Morrison found this depletion too insignificant to disrupt core executive functions. We
do not endorse this conclusion.
" See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
"
'"
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See supra note 153.
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57
prohibited from participating in special counsel prosecutions.
Each of these limitations stands in stark contrast to the
procedures approved in Young. While the special counsel provision does take responsibilities from the executive, it does not
give those responsibilities to another branch. In indirect criminal
contempt actions, on the other hand, initiation, supervision, and
sentencing are all controlled by the offended jurist.
Neither the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act
or the Supreme Court's recent validation of this practice reaffirms Young. The appointment of independent counsels infringes
on executive prerogatives less, increases only slightly the power
of article III courts, poses fewer threats of injustice in individual
cases, and rests on a more compelling rationale than the appointment of private contempt prosecutions.

CONCLUSION

Young hinges on two false premises. Claiming that criminal
contempt is a noncrime subject to criminal penalty, the Court
ducks the issue of traditional prosecutorial discretion. The source,
scope, and purpose of criminal contempt, however, refute this
suggestion. Young views the enforcement of court orders as a
judicial function, as opposed to an executive one. But indirect
criminal contempt does not speak to essential judicial functions,
nor is it a nonobtrusive means to preserve judicial authority
Instead, it is an open invitation to the judiciary to extend its
authority into the legislative sphere whenever it feels a litigant
has been unduly disrespectful.
At a time in the Court's history when great emphasis is
placed on the need for the executive and Congress to stay within
their respective spheres of authority, Young is a remarkable,
unjustifiable, and unnecessary aggrandizement of judicial power.

157

See id.

